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Abstract
This paper constructs an equilibrium matching model with risk-averse workers and
incomplete contracts to study both the optimal private provision of severance pay
and the consequences of government mandates in excess of the private optimum. The
privately-optimal severance payment is bounded below by the fall in lifetime wealth
resulting from job loss. Despite market incompleteness, mandated minimum payments
significantly exceeding the private optimum are effectively undone by adjustment of
the contractual wage, and have only small allocational and welfare effects.
J.E.L. classification codes: J23, J64, J65.
Keywords: employment protection, incomplete contracts, job creation, unemploy-
ment.
1 Introduction
Employment contracts often contain explicit severance-pay provisions.1 Indeed, in many
countries minimum levels of severance pay and other forms of employment protection are
enshrined in legislation. This is difficult to understand in the context of standard labor
market models in which homogeneous workers maximize expected labor income and wages
∗School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London, London E1 4NS, U.K. Email:
[g.fella@qmul.ac.uk] and [c.j.tyson@qmul.ac.uk].
1For the US, Bishow and Parsons (2004) document that from 1980–2001, roughly 40 percent of workers
in firms with more than 100 employees, plus 20 percent in smaller businesses, were covered by severance-
payment clauses. For the UK, the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey reveals that 51 percent of
union companies bargained over the size of (non-statutory) severance pay for non-manual workers and 42
percent for manual workers (see Millward, Neil et al. 1992). For Spain—a country usually thought to have
high levels of state-mandated employment protection—Lorences et al. (1995) document that from 1978–
91, the proportion of collective bargaining agreements establishing severance pay in excess of the legislated
minimum varied between 8 and 18 percent in the metal manufacturing sector and between 22 and 100 percent
in the construction sector.
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are perfectly flexible.2 As observed by Lazear (1990), employment protection measures have
no useful role in such a setting, and there is no reason why a firm taking aggregate quantities
as given would offer them. Thus, as Pissarides (2001) concludes, “much of the debate about
employment protection has been conducted within a framework that is not suitable for a
proper evaluation of its role in modern labor markets.”
This paper constructs a model that can be used to study both the optimal private provi-
sion of one form of employment protection, namely severance pay, as well as the allocational
and welfare consequences of government intervention mandating payments that exceed the
private optimum. We accomplish this by extending the matching model of Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) to allow for risk-averse workers, incomplete asset markets, and bargain-
ing over explicit contracts that feature a fixed wage and severance payment.3 As in the
Mortensen-Pissarides setting, workers face multiple sources of risk: Idiosyncratic productiv-
ity shocks create both wage and job-loss risk, while the uncertain duration of an unemploy-
ment spell amounts to re-employment risk.
The paper’s main results can be summarized as follows. First, privately-optimal severance
payments insure against job-loss risk. They are positive whenever market wages exceed
workers’ reservation wages, so that job loss is costly, and their size is bounded below by
the fall in permanent income associated with job loss. By establishing a closed-form lower
bound for the privately-optimal payment, the model provides a standard against which to
assess whether observed legislation in this area is excessive. We construct a series for our
lower bound in a sample of OECD countries and compare it to the corresponding series for
legislated payments. In a large fraction of these countries, we find that mandated payments
do not significantly exceed—and are often substantially below—the relevant lower bound.
Second, the allocational and welfare consequences of deviations from the private optimum
in line with those observed in most OECD countries are quantitatively small. The model
implies that factors increasing workers’ rents or unemployment duration—such as high work-
ers’ bargaining power, high costs of posting vacancies, or low matching efficiency—raise the
permanent-income drop associated with job loss and call for higher severance pay. For the
same reason, privately-optimal severance pay is negatively related to the unemployment-
benefit replacement rate. On the other hand, the model rules out reverse causation from
mandated severance payments to meaningful increases in workers’ rents and unemployment
duration.
Intuitively, mandated severance-pay minima overinsure workers against job loss and in-
duce a fall in the contractual wage to reestablish ex-ante profitability. These two effects
increase income fluctuations and the cost to firms of providing a given level of utility to
new hires. Fixing the utility level, mandated minima thus reduce job creation relative to
laissez-faire. With wages lower and severance payments higher, job destruction also falls.
This partial-equilibrium insight carries over to general equilibrium, with the extra effect that
2See Fella (2005) for a model with heterogeneous workers in which consensual termination restrictions
increase firms’ investment in the general training of unskilled workers.
3Privately-negotiated severance transfers are also unenforceable through reputation alone in the standard
matching framework with anonymity in which a firm coincides with one job and, when a job becomes
unprofitable, there are no third parties that can punish a firm that reneges on an implicit contract.
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the welfare of workers may fall as they absorb part of the higher labor cost.
Quantitatively, the effects of mandated severance payments are generally small. This is
because the contract wage falls so as to rebalance the parties’ shares of the surplus from a
new match.
The key feature of our model is incompleteness of contracts, with only the fixed wage and
severance payment specified. This rules out time- or state-dependent contractual terms, thus
eliminating the possibility of renegotiating any mandated payment by means of an ex-ante
contract at the time of hiring. Mandates are therefore a priori non-neutral. With risk-
neutral firms, broadening the space of contracts would increase their ability to substitute
for complete insurance markets, and hence make mandates more neutral. For example,
severance-pay legislation could be undone by a simple contract mandating that workers
rebate to firms the excess of legislated termination pay over its privately-optimal level. Since
courts are unlikely to enforce contractual terms aimed at circumventing legislation, such an
arrangement would be effective only if it were self-enforcing. This cannot be the case, since
a worker about to be fired would have no ex-post incentive to honor his ex-ante pledge.
In any event, despite the incompleteness of contracts we find that the wage adjustment
is sufficient to ensure near-neutrality of mandates.
This paper is related to several others in the literature. In contrast to Lazear (1990), we
develop microfoundations for the non-neutrality of legislated employment protection mea-
sures based on risk-averse workers and incomplete contracts, rather than wasteful firing
taxes.4 Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) and Bertola (2004) find that mandated severance
payments can improve welfare and efficiency in dynamic models with search frictions and
risk-averse workers, although neither paper allows for optimal private contracts. Finally, Pis-
sarides (2004) shows in a partial equilibrium setting that optimal private contracts feature
severance pay and (possibly) advance notice.5
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the economic
environment, while Section 3 studies the value functions, policy functions, and other key
components of the model. Section 4 characterizes its equilibrium and derives several an-
alytical results. Section 5 calibrates the model and assesses its quantitative implications.
Section 6 discusses our assumptions and offers some concluding comments. All proofs are in
Appendix A.1.
2 Model
Time is continuous and the horizon infinite. The economy contains a unit mass of workers,
each with an indivisible unit of labor, together with an endogenous mass of (active or inactive)
4Garibaldi and Violante (2005) and Fella (2007) argue that firing taxes are unlikely to be important
quantitatively.
5A related literature, initiated by Shavell and Weiss (1979), studies the optimal size and time path
of unemployment benefits in search and matching models with risk-averse workers. Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999) show that unemployment benefits increase welfare and efficiency (relative to laissez-faire) in a directed
search model without job loss. Blanchard and Tirole (2008) investigate the optimal financing of benefits by
means of layoff taxes.
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firms that each require one worker to produce. Workers are risk averse, firms are risk neutral,
and both have an infinite horizon.
Firms maximize the expected present value of profits discounted at the exogenous, riskfree
rate r > 0. At a given time t0, a worker maximizes the objective function
Ut0 := Et0
∫ ∞
t0
e−φ[t−t0]U(ct)dt, (1)
where Et0 is the expectation operator, φ > 0 is the subjective discount rate, U is the felicity
function, and ct is consumption at time t. While there are no insurance markets, the worker
can self-insure by borrowing and lending at the rate r. Denoting the stock of assets by at, its
rate of change (i.e., savings) by st, and income by it, the maximization of Ut0 is thus subject
to the dynamic budget identity st = rat + it − ct.6 To eliminate wealth effects we adopt the
CARA specification
U(c) = −e−αc (2)
for felicity, where α > 0. Moreover, we set φ = r, so that under complete markets each
worker would choose a flat consumption profile.
Unemployed workers and inactive firms meet via a random matching process governed by
a strictly concave function M . More precisely, if u represents the mass of unemployed workers
and v the mass of vacancies, M(u, v) is the flow of new matches. Defining market tightness
θ := v/u and assuming that the matching technology is strictly increasing and exhibits
constant returns, we have the contact rates M(u, v)/u = M(1, θ) =: p(θ) for unemployed
workers and M(u, v)/v = M(1/θ, 1) =: q(θ) for vacancies. Firms can open vacancies freely,
but each entails a flow cost of m > 0.
When worker and firm meet, the newly-formed match has productivity y = 1. This
variable is then subject to Poisson shocks at rate λ > 0, with the new values i.i.d. according
to a continuous distribution G with support [yl, 1].
7 Unemployed workers receive a flow b < 1
of benefits financed, as in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), by an endogenous, lump-sum tax τ .
The benefit program runs a balanced budget at all times.
When a new match is formed the parties negotiate a long-term contract σ = 〈w,F 〉,
where w is the wage and F the severance payment in the event of a layoff. Featuring
simple, state-independent terms, this type of agreement is broadly consistent with observed
labor contracts.8 We assume that the chosen σ is ex-ante (i.e., for y = 1) efficient, and
more specifically—in line with the matching literature—that this contract arises from the
6The worker’s consumption plan must also satisfy the no-Ponzi-game condition limt→∞ e−rtat ≥ 0 almost
surely.
7The assumption that new matches are maximally productive is without loss of generality. What matters
is that they have positive surplus.
8Proposition 3 will show that even our very simple contracts can deliver full insurance when severance
payments are unconstrained. Provided actual contracts are no less flexible, our findings will yield an upper
bound on the welfare and efficiency costs of government intervention relative to laissez-faire. (Section 6.1
discusses the implications of broadening the space of contracts.)
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Nash bargaining solution with weight γ ∈ [0, 1) on the worker’s gain.9 We also impose
the constraint F ≥ Fm on the determination of σ, where Fm ≥ 0 is a parameter. Here
Fm = 0 simply requires the contractual severance payment to be nonnegative, while higher
values of Fm can be used to introduce a government-mandated minimum payment that more
substantially restricts the space of feasible contracts.
While we assume for simplicity full commitment over the contractual wage and severance
payment, there is no commitment over the separation rule, which is determined by ex-post
incentives. After a productivity shock either party (or both) may wish to end the employment
relationship. Formally, the firm decides whether to keep the worker or to issue a dismissal
notice and pay the contractual amount F . A worker who is not dismissed can then decide
whether to stay in the job or to quit and receive no payment.
Crucially, it is assumed that when separation occurs payments are contingent on which
party takes verifiable steps to end the relationship. A separation is deemed a dismissal, and
the worker is entitled to the contractual severance payment, if the firm gives written notice
that the worker’s services are no longer required. On the other hand, a separation is deemed
a quit, and no payment is due, if the worker gives written notice that he or she no longer
intends to remain in employment (or simply stops showing up for work without obtaining
leave). Any claim by one party that the other has unilaterally severed the relationship must
be supported by documentation. This accords with existing practices in most industrialized
countries.
As stated above, in the main text for simplicity we rule out renegotiation of the contract
after a productivity shock. As a consequence, the separation decision is not Pareto-optimal
when the government-mandated severance pay minimum is binding. (In this respect the
agreed σ is ex ante only constrained efficient.) However, Pareto-optimal renegotiation of the
severance payment upon separation is allowed for in Appendix A.2.
3 Analysis
To analyze the model we shall restrict attention to stationary equilibria and proceed by
backward induction. Section 3.1 studies separation decisions and the associated transfers
and payoffs for an ongoing match with an arbitrary contract σ. Section 3.2 characterizes
the agreed contract σ∗ at the time a new match is formed, with both parties anticipating
that the contract will influence behavior and the resulting payoffs according to the preceding
analysis. Section 3.3 then adds steady-state conditions to close the model.
9Note that the proof of Rudanko’s (2009) Proposition 6 can be adapted to show that in our setting
the result of Nash bargaining coincides with that of competitive search when γ equals the elasticity of the
probability that a vacancy is filled (see Hosios 1990).
5
3.1 Separation decisions
The state of an ongoing match is fully characterized by the productivity y, the contract
σ = 〈w,F 〉, and the worker’s stock of assets a.10 In this section we study the separation
decisions that follow a productivity shock realizing y′, as a function of the state vector.
Let us indicate the value functions by W e(σ, a) for an employed worker, Je(y, σ, a) for a
producing firm, W u(a) for an unemployed worker, and V for a firm advertising a vacancy.11
Since there is free entry by firms we can conclude that V = 0 in equilibrium, and to simplify
the analysis we impose this condition from the outset. Finally, let W s(y′, σ, a) denote the
continuation value function for the worker after a shock realizing new productivity y′, but
before the separation decisions are made.
To characterize how the post-shock outcome depends on the state vector 〈y′, σ, a〉, it is
useful now to introduce the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
rW e(σ, a) = max
c
[U(c) + (ra+w− τ − c)W ea (σ, a)] + λ
[∫ 1
yl
W s(y′, σ, a)dG−W e(σ, a)
]
(3)
for an employed worker. The worker’s choice of c maximizes the total utility from current
consumption and savings—with the shadow price of the latter equal to the marginal value
W ea (σ, a) = ∂W
e(σ, a)/∂a of wealth—plus the expected gain in utility from a productivity
shock. The match experiences shocks at rate λ, and the integral is the expectation over the
new productivity realization y′ of the worker’s continuation value.
Assume now that W e(σ, a) ≥ W u(a), so that quitting is not optimal for the worker.12
After a shock the firm will then compare dismissal to employment with new productivity
y′, and its continuation value will be max{−F, Je(y′, σ, a)}. The Bellman equation for a
producing firm then appears as
rJe(y, σ, a) = y − w + λ
[∫ 1
yl
max{−F, Je(y′, σ, a)}dG− Je(y, σ, a)
]
, (4)
which is to say that the flow value of production equals the instantaneous profit y − w plus
the expected capital gain.
Equation (4) implies Jey(y, σ, a) = [r+λ]
−1 > 0, so for each relevant pair 〈σ, a〉 there exists
a unique layoff threshold y¯(σ, a) that satisfies Je(y¯(σ, a), σ, a) = −F . Using this definition
to eliminate the wage term and the integral over y′ in equation (4), we obtain
Je(y, σ, a) =
y − y¯(σ, a)
r + λ
− F (5)
for each y ≥ y¯(σ, a). Equation (4) itself now takes the form
rJe(y, σ, a) = y − w + λ
[∫ 1
y¯(σ,a)
y′ − y¯(σ, a)
r + λ
dG− F − Je(y, σ, a)
]
. (6)
10Given that the contractual severance payment must satisfy F ≥ Fm, there is no need to keep track of
this constraint after the contract is signed.
11To streamline notation we anticipate here that W e will be independent of the match productivity.
12The assumption is satisfied in equilibrium (see Proposition 1).
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Setting y = y¯(σ, a) and integrating by parts then yields
−rF = y¯(σ, a)− w + λ
∫ 1
y¯(σ,a)
1−G(y′)
r + λ
dy′. (7)
This relation defines y¯(σ, a) implicitly given σ, and since it does not depend on a we can
write y¯(σ) for the layoff threshold and Je(y, σ) for a producing firm’s payoff. If y′ < y¯(σ),
then we have that Je(y′, σ) < −F , the firm will dismiss, and the continuation values are
W s(y′, σ, a) = W u(a+ F ) for the worker and −F for the firm.
If Je(y′, σ) ≥ −F then the firm will not dismiss. Hence the worker will be employed with
new productivity y′ and the continuation values are W s(y′, σ, a) = W e(σ, a) for the worker
and Je(y′, σ) for the firm.
Finally, note that since W e(σ, a) ≥ W u(a) we can express equation (3) as
rW e(σ, a) = max
c
[U(c) + (ra+w− τ − c)W ea (σ, a)] + λ[W u(a+F )−W e(σ, a)]G(y¯(σ)). (8)
3.2 The initial contract and outside returns
This section derives optimality conditions for the initial contract as well as some properties
of the value and policy functions under the maintained assumption of CARA preferences.
When a match is formed, the contract is assumed to arise from Nash bargaining with
weight γ ∈ [0, 1) on the worker’s gain. Given wealth a, and writing the Nash objective
function as
Φ(σ, a) := [W e(σ, a)−W u(a)]γ[Je(1, σ)− V ]1−γ, (9)
we have that the chosen contract σ∗(a) maximizes Φ(σ, a) subject to the participation con-
straints W e(σ, a) ≥ W u(a) and Je(1, σ) ≥ V = 0 as well as the statutory restriction F ≥ Fm.
By assumption there are positive gains from employment, of which each party will receive
a non-negative share. Writing µ for the Lagrange multiplier associated with the worker’s
participation constraint, the first-order necessary conditions for a maximum are
Φw(σ
∗(a), a) + µ∗W ew(σ
∗(a), a) = 0, (10)
[F ∗(a)− Fm][ΦF (σ∗(a), a) + µ∗W eF (σ∗(a), a)] = 0, (11)
µ∗[W e(σ∗(a), a)−W u(a)] = 0. (12)
Here Equation (12) is the complementary-slackness condition for the worker’s participation
constraint. This is needed since we allow the worker’s bargaining weight γ to be zero, but
since 1 − γ > 0 no such condition is needed for the firm. Since all new matches lead to
employment, the worker’s value functions satisfy
rW u(a) = max
c
[U(c) + (ra+ b− τ − c)W ua (a)] + p(θ)[W e(σ∗(a), a)−W u(a)]. (13)
Here the first term on the RHS describes the unemployed worker’s consumption-savings
choice and the second term is his or her expected gain from finding a job.
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While equations (10)–(13) allow the initial contract to depend on the worker’s wealth
a, the CARA specification for felicity ensures that σ∗ and a number of other endogenous
variables are in fact independent of the stock of assets.13 These other variables include the
worker’s savings policy functions su and se, but not the consumption policy functions cu and
ce.
Proposition 1. Given θ and τ :
A. The functions σ∗, su, and se are independent of wealth, and for all asset levels we have
W e(σ∗, a) ≥ W u(a).
B. The value and consumption functions satisfy
rW u(a) = U(cu(a)) = −e−αcu(a), (14)
rW e(σ, a) = U(ce(σ, a)) = −e−αce(σ,a), (15)
cu(a) = ra+ b− τ − su, (16)
ce(σ, a) = ra+ w − τ − se(σ). (17)
C. The savings functions satisfy
rsu =
p(θ)
α
[
e−α(w
∗−se(σ∗)−b+su) − 1] , (18)
rse(σ) =
λG(y¯(σ))
α
[
e−α(b+rF−s
u−w+se(σ)) − 1] . (19)
Equations (16)–(19) imply that consumption is linear in wealth and savings are indepen-
dent of asset holdings. With CARA preferences it follows both that U(cu(a)) = e−αraU(cu(0))
and that U(ce(σ, a)) = e−αraU(ce(σ, 0)), and we can then write the worker’s gain from
contract σ as W e(σ, a) − W u(a) = e−αra[W e(σ, 0) − W u(0)]. Hence we have Φ(σ, a) =
e−γαraΦ(σ, 0), and so the solution of the Nash bargaining problem does not vary with the
worker’s wealth.
Equations (18)–(19) highlight that, with the discount and interest rates equal, saving
is driven entirely by a precautionary motive. For unemployed workers, saving is negative
if consumption increases upon re-employment, since workers self-insure against this risk by
running down their assets. For the same reason, saving is decreasing in the coefficient of
absolute risk aversion α. For employed workers, saving is negative—and decreasing in α—if
consumption increases upon job loss due to overinsurance.
Since the agreed contract σ∗ is independent of wealth, the value Je(1, σ∗) of a new job to
the employer also does not respond to changes in asset holdings. In consequence the Bellman
equation for the value of a vacancy takes the form
rV = −m+ q(θ)[Je(1, σ∗)− V ]. (20)
13Indeed, if this were not the case the state space would include the wealth distribution.
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Free entry implies V = 0, and using equation (5) we obtain the job-creation relation
m
q(θ)
=
1− y¯(σ∗)
r + λ
− F ∗. (21)
3.3 Steady-state conditions
Closing the model requires steady-state conditions for unemployment and the government
budget. The unemployment condition mandates balanced flows of workers into and out of
jobs. Recalling that u is the mass of unemployed workers, this can be expressed as
p(θ)u = λG(y¯(σ∗))[1− u]. (22)
And to balance the government budget we impose the equality
τ = bu (23)
of tax revenues received and unemployment benefits paid.
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Definition
A stationary equilibrium of our model can now be defined formally as follows.
Definition. A stationary equilibrium consists of value functions W e, W u, Je, and V = 0;
savings and consumption policy functions su, se, cu, and ce; a separation-decision rule y¯;
employment and tax variables u∗, θ∗, and τ ∗; and a contract σ∗ = 〈w∗, F ∗〉 and Lagrange
multiplier µ∗; jointly satisfying
• the Bellman equations (5), (8), and (13);
• the threshold equation (7);
• the consumption and savings equations (14)–(19);
• the job-creation equation (21) and steady-state conditions (22)–(23); and
• the first-order conditions (10) and (12), together with either
F ∗ ≥ Fm and ΦF (σ∗, 0) + µ∗W eF (σ∗, 0) = 0 (laissez-faire equilibrium), or
F ∗ = Fm and ΦF (σ∗, 0) + µ∗W eF (σ
∗, 0) ≤ 0 (binding-constraint equilibrium).
From equations (12) and (14)–(15) we have that consumption rises (weakly) upon the
worker finding a job, and employed workers enjoy positive quasi-rents if and only if γ > 0.
In such a case unemployed workers face re-employment risk and run down their savings
according to equation (18) in order to partially self-insure.
Proposition 2. In either a laissez-faire or binding-constraint equilibrium we have su ≤ 0,
with equality if and only if γ = 0.
9
4.2 Laissez-faire equilibrium
In this section we study the privately-negotiated contract in the absence of government
intervention. Our findings here will be valid whenever F ∗ > Fm.
The following lemma establishes some properties of an arbitrary contract.
Lemma 1. Given σ and a, the quantities ce(σ, a)− cu(a+F ), W e(σ, a)−W u(a+F ), se(σ),
and w − b+ su − rF all have the same sign.
This result is important for two reasons. Firstly, it characterizes (in terms of savings and
consumption behavior) the set {σ : w − b+ su − rF = 0} of contracts such that the worker
is indifferent between working at wage w and dismissal with payment F . Secondly, since
equations (14)–(15) together with CARA preferences imply that the worker’s value function
is proportional to the marginal utility of consumption, such contracts provide full insurance
against job-loss risk by ensuring that W e(σ, a) = W u(a+ F ).
If w − b + su − rF < 0, then we have cu(a + F ) > ce(σ, a) and the worker strictly
prefers dismissal with the contractual severance payment to working at the contractual wage.
Since consumption increases upon job loss—the worker is overinsured—borrowing is used to
smooth consumption (i.e., se(σ) < 0).
On the other hand, if w − b + su − rF > 0 then the worker strictly prefers working to
dismissal. Being underinsured against job loss by the contract, he or she thus self-insures by
saving (i.e., se(σ) > 0).
Given that there exist contracts that fully insure against job loss, it should not be sur-
prising that the initial contract agreed by the risk-averse worker and risk-neutral firm is of
this sort (absent a binding mandate).
Proposition 3. In the laissez-faire equilibrium, w∗−b+su−rF ∗ = 0 and the Nash bargaining
problem has a unique solution.
While the initial contract σ∗ fully insures against job loss, Proposition 2 shows that
the equilibrium provides complete insurance—including against re-employment risk—if and
only if γ = 0 and workers enjoy no rents. If γ > 0, then the income gain resulting from re-
employment constitutes a risk against which workers can only partially self-insure by running
down their assets (i.e., setting su < 0).14
Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 together imply se(σ∗) = 0, so from equations (14)–(15) we
have that b− su is the worker’s reservation wage. The contractual severance payment F ∗ is
proportional to the difference w∗− [b− su] between the contractual wage and the reservation
wage, and thus positive when the former exceeds the latter.
Setting σ = σ∗ in equation (7) now yields
b− su = y¯(σ∗) + λ
∫ 1
y¯(σ∗)
1−G(y′)
r + λ
dy′. (24)
14It follows (when γ > 0) that workers with positive unemployment duration have consumption that is
both declining and lower than that of their employed counterparts.
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The equilibrium layoff threshold y¯(σ∗) is therefore determined entirely by the reservation
wage, as in the model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) with risk-neutral workers. Note
that, as in equation (7), equation (24) determines y¯(σ∗) only implicitly. Similarly, su cannot
be expressed in closed form, as can be seen from equations (18) and (19).
Our next result establishes a lower bound on the contractual severance payment.
Proposition 4. In the laissez-faire equilibrium, F ∗ ≥ [w∗ − b]/[p(θ∗) + r] =: F , with strict
inequality for γ > 0 and F ∗ = F = 0 for γ = 0.
Here the bound F can be interpreted as the expected loss of lifetime wealth associated with
transiting through unemployment, and is equal to the present value of the income loss w∗−b
over the average unemployment spell.
If γ = 0, then w∗ = b and F = 0. If γ > 0, then employed workers enjoy economic rents
and the wealth cost F of a job loss is positive. In the latter case F ∗ exceeds F , and the intu-
ition for this runs as follows. Under a full-insurance contract consumption does not change
when the worker enters unemployment. Since the duration of unemployment is uncertain,
however, the variability of future consumption is higher for a job loser than for an employed
worker with the same assets. In view of the convexity of marginal utility, precautionary
saving leads the expected consumption profile of a job loser to be more upward-sloping (i.e.,
present consumption is further below permanent income) than that of an employed worker.
In order for consumption not to fall upon job loss, the permanent income of the job loser
must therefore exceed that of his employed counterpart.
4.3 Binding-constraint equilibrium
Characterizing equilibria involving a binding mandate is in general not feasible analytically.
In this section we study the effects of a mandated minimum severance payment in the special
case of γ = 0.
When γ = 0 employed workers enjoy no rents; i.e., W e(σ∗, a) = W u(a). In this case we
have su = 0 by Proposition 2 and hence w∗ − se(σ∗) = b by equations (14)–(15).
Proposition 5. If γ = 0 and F ∗ = Fm > 0, then w∗ < b.
Here the worker is indifferent between working and quitting, and prefers dismissal with any
strictly positive severance payment. In a laissez-faire equilibrium the agreed contract would
set the wage equal to the benefit level and specify no severance payment, and the firm would
fire the worker (efficiently) whenever Je(y′, 〈b, 0〉) < 0. In a binding-constraint equilibrium,
on the other hand, the contractual severance payment is set at the mandated level and
wages are strictly lower than benefits. Indeed, government intervention raises the payment
to job losers and reduces firms’ ex-ante profits, so the wage must fall in order to restore the
appropriate ex-ante surplus division. In comparison to laissez-faire, the government mandate
thus hinders the provision of insurance.15 Our next result concerns the allocational effects
15The fact that consumption is higher for the marginal job loser than for an employed worker is a con-
sequence of ruling out consensual renegotiation of the severance payment, an assumption that we relax in
Appendix A.2.
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of binding mandates.
Proposition 6. If γ = 0 and F ∗ = Fm > 0, then job creation p(θ∗) and job destruction
λG(y¯(σ∗)) are lower than under laissez-faire.
Intuitively, the cost to firms of providing workers with a given level of expected utility (before
taxes) increases with consumption variability, so job creation falls. Since also the dismissal
threshold and job destruction fall, the net effect on employment is ambiguous. In contrast
to Lazear’s (1990) conclusions, government intervention is non-neutral in our setting with
risk-averse workers and incomplete contracts.
Note that since W e(σ∗, a) = W u(a), the worker would prefer dismissal to continued
employment if offered any strictly positive severance transfer. However, separation occurs
if and only if the firm prefers to fire the worker and make the mandated payment Fm > 0.
The binding-constraint equilibrium therefore features Pareto-inefficient labor hoarding. As
previously mentioned, Appendix A.2 allows the severance payment to be renegotiated in
order to achieve Pareto-optimal separation.
While the qualitative analysis above for γ = 0 is a useful starting point, to study the
case of γ > 0 and to determine the quantitative effects of binding mandates we must proceed
numerically.
5 Quantitative implications
5.1 Actual versus privately-optimal severance pay
An important implication of our model is the lower bound F (in Proposition 4) on the
privately-optimal payment, which depends on wages, benefits, the duration of unemploy-
ment, and the interest rate. Since severance payments are usually expressed in relation to
the last wage, it is useful to define the relative lower bound f := F/w∗ and the replacement
rate of benefits ρ := b/w∗. The relative lower bound then takes the form
f =
1− ρ
p(θ∗) + r
(25)
and depends only on three observable quantities: the replacement rate, the unemployment
duration, and the interest rate. Equation (25) is thus a useful tool for determining whether
observed employment-protection measures are excessive.
In order to study this question, we choose an annual interest rate of 4 percent and use
data on unemployment durations and replacement rates for seventeen OECD countries to
construct a series for f . We also construct series for legislated dismissal payments and
notice periods for blue-collar and white-collar workers in the same countries, assuming a
representative worker with job tenure equal to the average completed tenure in the worker-
flow data in Nickell et al. (2002). (These series and the data used to construct them are
described in Appendix A.3.) Since in a number of countries it is notice periods that constitute
12
Figure 1: The relative lower bound f (horizontal axis) versus actual severance payments
(vertical axis) in seventeen OECD countries.
the bulk of firing costs for firms, they are combined with outright dismissal payments in our
series for legislated severance pay.
Figure 1 plots the relative lower bound f against the two series for legislated severance
payments to a worker of average tenure. In interpreting the figure, it is important to note
not only that f is a lower bound, but also that our legislated payments series is an upper
bound for the actual cost to firms since workers may find a new job before the expiration of
the mandated notice period. Thus if legislated severance payments matched optimal private
arrangements, we would expect to observe data points lying above the forty-five degree line.
The figure shows that for several countries legislated payments are significantly below the
level consistent with optimal insurance. In particular, payments for all workers in Ireland
and for blue-collar workers in Belgium are well below their optimal levels. Given the high
duration of unemployment in these two countries over the sample period, these legislated
payments underinsure workers. (The same is true for France and New Zealand.) Spain and
Italy, two countries often deemed to have extreme levels of employment protection, turn
out to have legislated payments that exceed the relevant lower bound by, respectively, one
month and at most six months. This is not surprising in light of the average unemployment
duration exceeding thirty months for Italy and forty months for Spain. Note that the two
starred observations for Italy refer to the period before 1991, when the replacement rate
was raised from three to forty percent. These observations make clear the extent to which,
despite the very high level of dismissal costs, Italian workers were underinsured before the
reform.
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Portugal is the most extreme case, where mandated severance payments exceed the lower
bound by slightly more than eleven months. With effectively the same replacement rate and
an unemployment duration roughly one-third of the Spanish one, its privately-optimal sever-
ance payment should also be approximately one third that in Spain. Yet observed legislated
payments in Portugal are even higher than the Spanish level. Note that severance payments
for white-collar workers in Belgium also exceed the lower bound by eleven months. In this
case, however—as in countries such as Denmark and Sweden—notice periods constitute the
bulk of the legislated payment reported in the figure (see Appendix A.3) and so the actual
cost to firms is likely to be lower.
The above discussion makes clear that if legislated employment protection is judged
by the extent to which it insures against job loss, then—with the possible exception of
Portugal—there is little support for the view that most OECD or even Mediterranean coun-
tries offer protection significantly above privately-optimal levels. However, since our series
for privately-optimal payments has been constructed using observed unemployment dura-
tions, this comparison does not allow for the widely-debated possibility that the positive
relationship between legislated protection measures and unemployment duration reflects re-
verse causation from high mandated job security to low job creation. We shall return to this
issue below, showing in Section 5.3 that the question of observed versus counterfactual—
laissez-faire—durations is not quantitatively important.
5.2 Calibration
We calibrate our model to the Portuguese economy. There are several reasons for this choice.
First, Portugal has a notoriously high level of employment protection.16 Second, severance
pay mandates matter in our setting only insofar as they exceed private optima. Intuitively,
it is the difference between the former and the latter that determines the allocational and
welfare effects of government intervention. As noted in Section 5.1, Portugal—together with
Belgium—has the largest measured difference between mandated and optimal severance
pay, and is also one of the countries where outright payments are the main component of
firing costs. Thus the Portuguese case seems a natural setting in which to investigate the
consequences of excessive mandated severance pay.
We choose parameter values using a combination of external sources and calibration.
We adopt the Cobb-Douglas matching function M(u, v) = uηv1−η and assume that the
productivity distribution G is uniform on [0, 1].17 Unemployment benefits and mandated
severance payments relative to wages are defined as ρ := b/w and fm := Fm/w. Hence the
model has a total of eight parameters: r, α, m, λ, γ, η, ρ, and fm.
All flow variables are per quarter, and the interest rate is r = 0.01. The coefficient
of absolute risk aversion is set at α = 1.7, which implies a value of αcu(0) = 1.5 for the
coefficient of relative risk aversion of an unemployed worker with zero wealth. The latter
16See, for example, Blanchard and Portugal (2000) and the sources therein.
17Normalizing to unity the scale parameter of the matching function is without loss of generality. This
merely determines the units in which v (and hence θ) are measured.
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Parameter Value Moment to match
Absolute RA coefficient α 1.7 Estimates in Attanasio (1999)
Interest rate r 0.01 Average real interest rate
Matching elasticity η 0.5 Estimates in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
Bargaining power γ 0.5 Hosios (1990) condition
Productivity lower support yl 0 Normalization
Benefit replacement rate ρ 0.65 Estimates in Nickell (1997)
Mandated sev. pay fm 5.7 Estimates in European Foundation (2002)
Vacancy posting cost m 10.4 Unemployment duration of 17 months†
Shock arrival rate λ 0.015 Unemployment rate of 6.5%†
† See footnote 18 for source.
Table 1: Summary of the model calibration.
lies in the middle of the range of available estimates (see, e.g., Attanasio 1999). We set
the elasticity of the matching function at η = 0.5, consistent with the evidence supplied in
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). The workers’ bargaining power parameter is chosen to
be γ = 0.5, which implies (see footnote 9) that the outcome of bargaining coincides with
that of competitive search. (This also implies that the decentralized equilibrium is efficient
if workers are risk neutral and there are no unemployment benefits.)
The remaining parameters are calibrated to Portuguese policies and data, including a
replacement rate of ρ = 0.65 and a mandated severance payment of fm = 5.7 times the
quarterly wage (or 17 times the monthly wage; see Appendix A.3). Finally, the cost of
posting a vacancy and the productivity shock arrival rate are set at m = 10.4 and λ = 0.015,
to match an average unemployment duration of 17 months and an unemployment rate of
6.5 percent (or equivalently an unemployment inflow rate of 1.2 per cent per quarter).18
Our calibration is summarized in Table 1. Appendix A.5 discusses some of the calibration
choices.
5.3 Quantitative impact of binding mandates
We now investigate the impact of severance-pay mandates relative to laissez-faire. In Table 2
the second and third columns show the allocational and welfare effects in our calibrated
economy of mandates corresponding to 17 and 24 months of wages, with the laissez-faire
situation in the first column.19 The privately-optimal severance payment is 6 months, against
18The unemployment duration and rate targets come from the OECD unemployment statistics (1985–94);
see Blanchard and Portugal’s (2000) Figure 4. Using the Portuguese Labour Force Survey, Bover et al.
(2000) find a slightly higher duration of 20 months over 1992–97. Despite using the same worker outflow
data in their empirical exercise, Blanchard and Portugal (2000) assume a much lower value of 9 months in
their calibration.
19The quantities with no meaningful unit of measurement, namely net output and welfare, are reported
as a percentage of their values in the fourth column (describing the efficient, laissez-faire equilibrium). The
(present value of) net output is the shadow value of an unemployed worker, which—as in Acemoglu and
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(l.-f.) (+11) (+18) (l.-f.) (+11) (+18)
Months of wages 6 17 24 10 21 28
Value of ρ = b/w 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.05 0.05 0.05
Job finding rate (%) 18.2 17.8 17.6 28.7 28.3 28.0
Job destruction (%) 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1
Unemployment rate (%) 7.0 6.5 6.2 4.3 4.0 3.8
Gross wage (×100) 92.8 88.7 86.5 88.8 85.2 83.2
Tax (×100) 4.0 3.8 3.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
Net output 98.4 98.4 98.2 100.0 99.8 99.5
Employed Welfare 100.1 100.1 99.9 100.0 99.8 99.4
Unemployed Welfare 101.3 101.3 101.1 100.0 99.7 99.3
Table 2: Allocational and welfare effects of severance-pay mandates in the economy with
ρ = 0.65 and in the (constrained-efficient) economy with ρ = 0.05.
17 months in our benchmark case of Portugal and the maximum of 24 months in Figure 1.
For the sake of comparison, the fourth column reports outcomes for the constrained-efficient
economy where (as in Acemoglu and Shimer 1999) a planner chooses the benefit rate to
maximize net output, setting ρ = 0.05.20
Qualitatively, introducing severance-pay mandates reduces both job creation and job
destruction, in line with our theoretical results. Although the employment and welfare
effects are a priori ambiguous, mandates increase employment and reduce both efficiency
and workers’ welfare, in the calibrated as well as the efficient economy. Quantitatively,
however, both the allocational and welfare effects are remarkably small even for mandates
dramatically in excess of the private optimum.
Severance-pay mandates have an ambiguous effect on net output because of the usual
entry/exit externalities on the job-creation and job-destruction margins. Fella (2012) shows
that in the absence of imperfectly experience-rated unemployment benefits, it is not socially
optimal to distort the privately-determined separation decision. This is no longer necessarily
true if benefits are inefficiently high and lead to excessive job destruction. With lump-sum
taxes and benefits only the entry externalities are relevant for efficiency, but with regard
to welfare there are two further effects. Firstly, a fall in unemployment reduces taxes and
increases welfare. This externality is unambiguously positive and is not internalized by the
firm-worker pair. And secondly, when workers are risk-averse, mandates reduce welfare to the
Shimer (1999)—is maximized in the efficient equilibrium. Welfare is thus measured as the percentage of
permanent consumption in the efficient equilibrium that yields an equivalent level of utility. Of course, non-
normalized welfare is higher for employed than for unemployed workers. The former is about 3.5 percentage
points higher than the latter in the efficient equilibrium.
Since allocational and welfare effects are monotonic functions of the size of the severance-pay mandate,
we report simulations for a small number of values only.
20In contrast to Acemoglu and Shimer’s (1999) model, here the equilibrium is only constrained efficient
since one instrument is insufficient to align both job creation and job destruction. In practice, however, the
equilibrium allocation agrees with the efficient allocation with risk-neutral workers to at least three decimal
places.
16
extent that they increase the re-employment risk by lengthening unemployment durations.
The fifth and sixth columns in Table 2 show the effects in the constrained-efficient econ-
omy of introducing mandates that exceed privately-optimal severance pay by the same
amounts (11 and 18 months) as simulated in the economy with ρ = 0.65. Here the ef-
fects are qualitatively similar but larger in magnitude. Intuitively, when the planner sets
unemployment benefits at their efficient level the privately optimal separation rate in the
laissez-faire equilibrium is close to the efficient one. Therefore the labor hoarding associated
with a binding mandate further reduces efficiency, as it no longer counteracts an inefficiently-
high separation due to inefficiently-high benefits. Moreover, since employment and hence
also the lump-sum tax fall by less in this case, the welfare loss is larger than when ρ = 0.65.
It is also instructive to compare the laissez-faire outcomes across the two economies.
Note in this regard that severance payments are not a perfect substitute for unemployment
benefits, even for the purpose of output maximization. Indeed, the benefit rate in the
efficient economy is 0.05, rather than zero.21 In addition, although even mandated severance
payments dramatically above the private optimum have only small allocational and welfare
effects, raising the benefit rate from 0.05 to 0.65 increases unemployment by nearly 70 percent
and reduces output by nearly 12 percent.
Observe in addition that the optimal severance payment is decreasing in the benefit
replacement rate—it is ten months of wages when ρ = 0.05 versus six months when ρ = 0.65.
The lower bound in equation (25) reveals the two opposing forces affecting the optimal
payment. On the one hand, a smaller ρ exacerbates the fall in income associated with job
loss and calls for a higher payment. On the other, a smaller ρ reduces workers’ bargaining
power and thereby both the average unemployment duration 1/p(θ) and the cost of job loss.
As it turns out, the first effect prevails and the relationship between the benefit rate and the
optimal payment is negative.
We next investigate whether this negative relationship is a robust feature of the model
and whether the magnitude of the allocational and welfare changes is sensitive to the size of
the benefit replacement rate. To do this, we repeat the above exercise for values of the benefit
rate ranging from zero to 0.9 and with all other parameters as in the benchmark economy.
In the spirit of bounding the quantitative effects from above, we impose a mandate that
exceeds the laissez-faire severance payment by 11 months—the largest difference observed in
Figure 1 and equal to the difference between the first and second columns in Table 2.
The results of these simulations are displayed in Figure 2, where the horizontal axis
reports the benefit replacement rate in the laissez-faire equilibrium.22 Here the heavy solid
line plots the privately-optimal severance payment, measured on the right-hand axis. This
quantity declines from ten months when ρ = 0.0 to three months when ρ = 0.9. The left-
21Here the intuition is as in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), and is clearest in the present setting where
there are no wealth effects and past severance payments do not affect bargaining power. For given Nash
weights, increased concavity of the felicity function reduces the worker’s effective bargaining strength. Thus,
if Hosios’s (1990) condition holds and there are no benefits, the firm’s share of surplus is inefficiently high
provided workers’ marginal utility is decreasing.
22Note the minor difference relative to Table 2, where the benefit replacement rate equals 0.65 in the
benchmark (not the laissez-faire) economy.
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Figure 2: Effects of severance-pay mandates for a range of benefit replacement rates.
hand axis measures the change in the unemployment rate and the percentage changes in net
output and welfare relative to laissez-faire.
The change in unemployment is negative and mildly decreasing, and the changes in net
output and welfare are mildly increasing in the benefit rate. Indeed, mandates increase
output and welfare when ρ > 0.65, as the social benefit from privately-inefficient labor
hoarding is higher the more the unemployment benefits exceeds its socially-efficient level.23
But overall, our finding that the allocational and welfare effects of mandates are small is
seen to be robust.
The intuition for the small magnitude of these effects is that the wage falls as a pre-
payment for the higher (mandated) severance transfer. The increased income uncertainty
associated with government intervention raises the cost to the firm of providing the worker
with a given level of utility, thereby reducing job creation. But this effect is small, both
because the fixed wage smoothes the prepayment over employment states, and because the
overinsurance against job loss is effectively undone by the employed worker’s savings behav-
ior.
23This effect is absent, and the output and welfare changes are negative and decreasing in ρ, if efficient
separation can be achieved via renegotiation (see Appendix A.2).
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6 Discussion
6.1 Assumptions
With a view towards bounding from above the impact of government intervention, this
paper has restricted attention to highly incomplete contracts featuring state-independent
wages and severance payments. As we have seen, with CARA felicity this class of contracts
is rich enough to provide full insurance against job loss in laissez-faire. It is not, however,
sufficient to sustain full insurance when a severance-pay mandate is imposed. Enriching the
space of contracts—for example, by allowing ex-ante agreements on state-contingent rebates
of part of the mandated payment—would trivially reestablish full neutrality, a fact pointed
out by Lazear (1990). But as noted in Section 1, such a contract would be unenforceable.
Note that we have also ruled out lump-sum wealth transfers at the beginning of a match.
If such transfers were possible, insurance against job loss would not necessarily require a
positive severance payment. An optimal contract could then specify a wage equal to the
unemployed worker’s reservation value b− su, no severance payment, and an upfront wealth
transfer giving the worker the appropriate share of quasi-rents.24
From the empirical point of view, this assumption is justified by the observation that
upfront wealth transfers are observed only rarely, likely because they can leave firms exposed
to opportunistic shirking or quitting.25 From the theoretical perspective, our analysis of the
laissez-faire equilibrium in Section 4.2 would still be valid, since our modeling choice is just
a normalization. The only caveat here is that the lower bound on the severance payment in
Proposition 4 would no longer be determinate.
Of course, in the binding-constraint equilibrium our choice of contracting margins is no
longer simply a normalization. In this case, absent borrowing constraints, allowing lump-
sum transfers of unrestricted sign would once again lead to neutrality. By Proposition 3,
full insurance against job loss could still be achieved by raising the wage in response to an
increase in the mandate Fm to maintain the optimality condition w−b+su−rFm = 0, while
at the same time reducing the lump-sum transfer to the worker to reestablish the correct
ex-ante shares of surplus. Moreover, our analysis in Sections 4.3 and 5—which assumes
zero hiring transfers—would still apply provided transfers from firms to workers upon hiring
cannot be negative.
Throughout the paper we have also assumed that unemployment benefits are lump sum.
If, on the other hand, they were to respond strongly to wages—for example, if they were
proportional with a replacement rate above 0.5—then the fall in benefits resulting from
the fall in wages would reduce the threat point and equilibrium utility of new hires by
so much that firms’ profits would increase. In such cases government intervention would
lead to more job creation and higher employment. With a replacement rate above 0.8, the
24It is well known that if agents are not subject to liquidity constraints, then the timing of transfers is
indeterminate given enough degrees of freedom; see, e.g., Werning (2002). Our normalization is equivalent
to that of Werning, who disallows taxes upon employment.
25Also, to the extent that unemployment benefits are an increasing function of the last wage, it is not
optimal for a contract to front-load payments to workers.
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increase in employment would be significant for mandated severance payments that are large
in comparison to the private optimum.26
Finally, we have assumed, as in Shimer and Werning (2008), that leisure yields zero utility.
As long as consumption and leisure are imperfect substitutes and their utility additively
separable,27 the privately-optimal severance payment will still be determined by consumption
insurance, and our result on the optimal size of this payment will still apply, even if the utility
of leisure were different from zero. As a further robustness exercise, Appendix A.4 explores
the case in which consumption and leisure are perfect substitutes.
6.2 Concluding comments
This paper studies the provision of insurance to workers by means of simple employment
contracts when asset markets are incomplete and searching for a job is costly. We establish
that positive severance payments are part of the optimal contract whenever employed workers
enjoy positive rents. More importantly, we derive a lower bound on the optimal payment
as a function of observable quantities. This bound amounts to the fall in lifetime wealth
associated with job loss, and hence decreases with the benefit replacement rate and increases
with the duration of unemployment.
The paper does not provide normative support for minimum severance payments to be
enshrined in legislation. Firms have an incentive to evade both legislated and privately-
contracted payments, and courts face the same informational asymmetries in enforcing both
types of measures. From a positive perspective, one explanation for government intervention
(along the lines of Saint-Paul 2002) is that it reflects the ability of employed insiders to
extract a one-off gain at the expense of the present and future unemployed.28 Nevertheless,
if we are willing to assume that legislated measures reflect, to some extent, the degree to
which the private optimum calls for them, then our model predicts (ceteris paribus) a direct
relationship between job-security measures and the expected income loss associated with
transiting through unemployment.
Indirect evidence consistent with this prediction is supplied by Boeri et al. (2001), who
find a negative correlation between measures of employment protection and unemployment
benefits. More direct evidence comes from regressing legislated dismissal costs on the ex-
pected income cost f of job loss. Estimating this relationship separately for blue-collar and
white-collar workers yields the following (standard errors in parentheses):
26Recall from Section 5.3 that only two of the OECD countries in our data set have rates above 0.8.
27These two assumptions are standard in the literature on optimal unemployment insurance to which
our paper is related; e.g., Shavell and Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999), Shimer and Werning (2008), Coles and Masters (2006), Coles (2008), and Pavoni (2009).
28The outcome is self-sustaining as new generations of insiders, whose contract wage was determined based
on the excessive mandated severance pay, would be harmed by a reform that reduced the latter.
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fBC = 1.84
(1.90)
+ 0.55
(0.23)
f R¯2 = 0.23 s.e. = 5.20, (26)
fWC = 2.74
(2.34)
+ 0.70
(0.28)
f R¯2 = 0.24 s.e. = 6.39. (27)
We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the series for f and for
legislated dismissal costs (measured by the sum of outright payments and notice periods)
fBC for blue-collar and fWC for white-collar workers.
In principle, the positive association observed here could reflect reverse causation from
high legislated job security to high unemployment duration, as emphasized in the literature
on employment protection. However, it is a robust finding of this paper that even with
very incomplete markets, severance pay mandates do not cause high unemployment rates
or durations. In the context of our model, it is rather the factors that affect the dura-
tion of unemployment—including matching frictions, unemployment benefits, and workers’
bargaining power—that can be said to determine optimal severance payments.
A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. From the worker’s sequence problem we have the Euler equation
U ′(ct0) = Et0U ′(ct) for each t ≥ 0. The CARA felicity function satisfies U ′(c) = −αU(c),
and it follows that U(ct0) = Et0U(ct). For an unemployed worker equation (1) can then
be written as W u(at0) = U(c
u(at0))
∫∞
t0
e−r[t−t0]dt = U(cu(at0))/r, and stationarity allows
us to drop the time subscript. Thus we have rW u(a) = U(cu(a)), and similarly for an
employed worker rW e(σ, a) = U(ce(σ, a)). Differentiating these equations with respect to a
and using the first-order conditions U ′(cu(a)) = W ua (a) and U
′(ce(σ, a)) = W ea (σ, a) for the
consumption choices, we obtain cua(a) = r = c
e
a(σ, a). The dynamic budget identity then
ensures that su(a) and se(σ, a) are independent of a and so equations (14)–(15) hold.
From equations (16)–(17) we see that consumption depends on wealth only through the
additively separable term ra. Together with the CARA felicity function this implies that
W e(σ, a)−W u(a) = e−αra[W e(σ, 0)−W u(0)] for any 〈σ, a〉. Hence maximization of the Nash
objective function Φ(σ, a) = e−αraγΦ(σ, 0) is unaffected by changes in wealth, and so σ∗(a)
is independent of a.
Finally, substituting for the value functions in equations (8) and (13), using the first-order
conditions for consumption optima, and rearranging terms yields
rsu =
p(θ)
α
[
U ′(ce(σ∗, a))
U ′(cu(a)
− 1
]
, (28)
rse(σ) =
λG(y¯(σ))
α
[
U ′(cu(a+ F ))
U ′(ce(σ, a))
− 1
]
. (29)
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Equations (18)- (19) then follow from the CARA functional form and replacing for consump-
tion using (16)-(17).
Proof of Proposition 2. In text.
Proof of Lemma 1. We have ce(σ, a) ≥ cu(a+F ) if and only if U ′(ce(σ, a)) ≤ U ′(cu(a+F )),
which by equation (19) is equivalent to se(σ) ≥ 0. The equivalence of both
w − b+ su − rF = [ce(σ, a)− cu(a+ F )] + se(σ) ≥ 0 (30)
and W e(σ, a) ≥ W u(a+ F ) then follows from equations (14)–(15).
Lemma 2. We have
Jew(y, σ) =
−1
r + λG(y¯(σ))
(31)
JeF (y, σ) =
−λG(y¯(σ))
r + λG(y¯(σ))
. (32)
Furthermore,
W ew(σ, a) ≤
W ea (σ, a) + s
e(σ)W eaw(σ, a)
r + λG(y¯(σ))
(33)
and
W eF (σ, a) ≥
λG(y¯(σ))W ua (a+ F ) + s
e(σ)W eaF (σ, a)
r + λG(y¯(σ))
(34)
are each separately equivalent to W e(σ, a) ≥ W u(a+ F ).
Proof. From equation (7) we have y¯F (σ) = −r[r+λ][r+λG(y¯(σ))]−1 = −ry¯w(σ), and using
these relationships to differentiate (5) leads to (31)–(32). Moreover, differentiating equation
(8) with respect to w yields
[r+λG(y¯(σ))]W ew(σ, a) +λy¯w(σ)[W
e(σ, a)−W u(a+F )] = W ea (σ, a) + se(σ)W eaw(σ, a). (35)
Since y¯w(σ) > 0 we have that W
e(σ, a) ≥ W u(a+F ) is equivalent to equation (33), and the
equivalence of (34) is established by a similar argument employing y¯F (σ) < 0.
Lemma 3. We have
W eF (σ, a)
W ew(σ, a)
≥ J
e
F (y, σ)
Jew(y, σ)
(36)
if and only if w − b+ su − rF ≥ 0.
Proof. Equations (31)–(32) yield
JeF (y, σ)
Jew(y, σ)
= λG(y¯(σ)). (37)
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Moreover, equations (14)–(15) and the CARA specification for U imply that
W ua (a) = U
′(cu(a)) = −rαe−αraW u(0), (38)
W ea (σ, a) = U
′(ce(σ, a)) = −rαe−αraW e(σ, 0). (39)
Thus W eaw(σ, a) = −rαW ew(σ, a) and W eaF (σ, a) = −rαW eF (σ, a); and equations (33), (34),
and (37) can be combined to show that
W eF (σ, a)
W ew(σ, a)
≥ U
′(cu(a+ F ))
U ′(ce(σ, a))
JeF (y, σ)
Jew(y, σ)
(40)
is equivalent to W e(σ, a) ≥ W u(a+ F ). The result then follows from Lemma 1.
Lemma 4. Given J◦, the unique Pareto-optimal contract σ satisfying Je(1, σ) = J◦ is such
that w− b+ su− rF = 0. Moreover, the Pareto frontier in payoff space is strictly decreasing,
strictly concave, and differentiable.
Proof. Pareto optimality of σ ensures that W eF (σ, a)/W
e
w(σ, a) = J
e
F (1, σ)/J
e
w(1, σ), and from
Lemma 3 it follows that w − b + su − rF = 0. Since the locus of contracts satisfying
Je(1, σ) = J◦ is downward-sloping in 〈w,F 〉-space, these two equations characterize the
unique Pareto optimum for fixed J◦. Setting w = b− su + rF in equation (7), we obtain
b− su = y¯(σ) + λ
∫ 1
y¯(σ)
1−G(y′)
r + λ
dy′. (41)
Hence y¯(σ) is independent of F for contracts yielding payoff vectors on the Pareto frontier,
and so from equation (5) we have dJe(1, b− su + rF, F )/dF = −1. In view of Lemma 1 and
equation (14), we have also that W e(b− su + rF, F, a) = W u(a+F ) is differentiable, strictly
increasing, and strictly concave in F ; and the desired properties of the Pareto frontier follow
as a consequence.
Proof of Proposition 3. Since the agreed contract σ∗ maximizes the objective function in
equation (9), the associated payoff vector 〈W e(σ∗, a), Je(1, σ∗)〉 is on the Pareto frontier.
Moreover, this frontier is strictly concave by Lemma 4 and the Nash maximand is strictly
quasi-concave in the payoffs, so the solution is uniquely determined. Finally, Lemma 4
ensures that w∗ − b+ su − rF ∗ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. We have w∗ − b + su − rF ∗ = 0 by Proposition 3, and so F ∗ ≥ F
is equivalent to su ≥ −p(θ∗)[w∗ − b]/[p(θ∗) + r]. Moreover se(σ∗) = 0 by Lemma 1, and so
Equation (18) takes the form
αrsu = p(θ∗)
[
e−α[w
∗−b+su] − 1] . (42)
Since the LHS and the RHS of this equation are strictly increasing and decreasing in su,
respectively, it suffices to show that the LHS is no larger than the RHS for the value su =
−p(θ∗)[w∗ − b]/[p(θ∗) + r]. This amounts to the inequality
1 +
−αr[w∗ − b]
p(θ∗) + r
≤ exp −αr[w
∗ − b]
p(θ∗) + r
, (43)
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which is easily seen to hold strictly for w∗ > b and as an equality for w∗ = b. It follows
that when γ > 0 and the income loss w∗− b from unemployment is strictly positive, we have
F ∗ > F . Alternatively, when γ = 0 and w∗ − b = 0 we have F ∗ = F = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. Since γ = 0 we have W e(σ∗, a) = W u(a) and thus w∗ = b + se(σ∗)
by equations (14)–(15) and Proposition 2. Furthermore, since F ∗ = Fm > 0 we have that
cu(a + F ∗) > cu(a) = ce(σ∗, a), that U ′(cu(a + F ∗)) < U ′(ce(σ∗, a)), and that se(σ∗) < 0 by
equation (19). Hence w∗ < b.
Proof of Proposition 6. Since γ = 0 and F ∗ = Fm > 0 we have w∗ < b by Proposition 5,
and moreover su = 0 by Proposition 2. Hence w∗ − b+ su − rF ∗ < 0, and thus by Lemma 3
we have W eF (σ
∗, a)/W ew(σ
∗, a) < JeF (y, σ
∗)/Jew(y, σ
∗). This establishes that the contract
σ∗ is inefficient, and nevertheless the worker obtains the same payoff gross of lump-sum
taxes as under (efficient) laissez-faire. It follows that the firm’s payoff Je(1, σ∗) is lower;
equation (20) then implies that q(θ∗) is higher; and since the matching technology M is
strictly increasing we have that job creation p(θ∗) is lower. Furthermore, writing σ for the
laissez-faire equilibrium contract, we have
y¯(σ∗) + λ
∫ 1
y¯(σ∗)
1−G(y′)
r + λ
dy′ = w∗ − rF ∗ < b = y¯(σ) + λ
∫ 1
y¯(σ)
1−G(y′)
r + λ
dy′ (44)
by equation (7). This yields y¯(σ∗) < y¯(σ), and so job destruction λG(y¯(σ∗)) is lower.
A.2 Renegotiation of the severance payment
After a productivity shock (i.e., for y < 1) the agreed contract may no longer be efficient.
In this section we consider the possibility of renegotiation to capture additional surplus. For
simplicity we model only the option to adjust the severance payment, since this is what is
important for determining the impact of a government mandate.29
Renegotiation after a shock proceeds as follows. The worker employed under contract
σ = 〈w,F 〉 makes a new severance offer F ′ to the firm. The firm can accept this offer and
pay F ′, reject it and propose that employment continue under the contract σ, or dismiss the
worker outright and pay F . Continuation of employment requires the consent of the worker,
who remains free to quit and receive no payment. Importantly, the renegotiated quantity
F ′ is paid on the spot and unconstrained by the government-mandated minimum Fm on the
contractual amount.30
Note first that if W e(σ, a) < W u(a), then a worker who is not dismissed will choose to
quit. Monotonicity of U guarantees that W e will be strictly increasing in all arguments, and
it follows that for each relevant 〈F, a〉 there exists a unique reservation wage w(F, a) that
29In fact, it can be shown that renegotiating the contract wage would never be optimal.
30Indeed, the firm-worker pair can implement a spot payment F ′ < Fm in two equivalent ways: They
can agree to call the separation a quit (or “voluntary redundancy”) rather than a dismissal, in which case
transfers between them are unconstrained by legislation. Or they can describe the separation as a layoff,
with the worker rebating to the firm, on the spot, the difference F − F ′ > 0.
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0 ww(F, a)
yl
y′
1
Q
〈W u(a), 0〉
D 〈W u(a+ F ),−F 〉
C 〈W e(σ, a), Je(y′, σ)〉
R
〈W u(a− Je(y′, σ)),
Je(y′, σ)〉
yˆ(σ, a)
y¯(σ)
Figure 3: Post-shock outcomes allowing for renegotiation. Given 〈F, a〉, the consequences
of a productivity shock are shown in 〈w, y′〉-space. The worker quits (case Q) if the wage
is below w(F, a). The firm dismisses the worker (case D) if productivity is below y¯(σ).
Employment continues (case C) if productivity exceeds both yˆ(σ, a) and y¯(σ). And the two
parties separate with a renegotiated severance payment (case R) if productivity is between
yˆ(σ, a) and y¯(σ). In each region the first component of the payoff vector accrues to the
worker and the second to the firm.
satisfies W e(w(F, a), F, a) = W u(a). If w is below w(F, a) then the worker will quit and the
continuation values are W s(y′, σ, a) = W u(a) for the worker and 0 for the firm.
Renegotiation is relevant when the worker will not quit and the firm will not dismiss.
(The condition for dismissal remains as in Section 3.1.) Since the worker makes a take-it-
or-leave-it offer, the amount proposed will be the firm’s reservation payoff F ′ = −Je(y′, σ),
and the firm will be left indifferent between accepting the offer and continuing the match.
Moreover, the productivity threshold yˆ(σ, a) below which renegotiation occurs is determined
by the relation
W e(σ, a) = W u(a− Je(yˆ(σ, a), σ)). (45)
When y′ is above this threshold the match survives and the continuation payoffs remain
〈W e(σ, a), Je(y′, σ)〉, as in the model without renegotiation. Alternatively, if y′ < yˆ(σ, a)
then the two parties separate with a renegotiated transfer and the continuation payoffs are
〈W u(a− Je(y′, σ)), Je(y′, σ)〉. For fixed 〈F, a〉, Figure 3 plots the renegotiation threshold in
〈w, y′〉-space together with the thresholds w(F, a) for quitting and y¯(σ) for dismissal.
When W e(σ, a) ≥ W u(a) and so the worker does not quit, we can now express the job
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destruction threshold and the severance payment after renegotiation as
yd(σ, a) = max{yˆ(σ, a), y¯(σ)}, (46)
F r(y′, σ) = F − max{y
′ − y¯(σ), 0}
r + λ
. (47)
With these definitions, equation (3) can be written as
rW e(σ, a) = max
c
[U(c) + (ra+ w − τ − c)W ea (σ, a)] + · · ·
λ
[∫ yd(σ,a)
yl
W u(a+ F r(y′, σ))dG−G(yd(σ, a))W e(σ, a)
]
. (48)
Allowing for renegotiation requires the following modifications to Proposition 1. First,
in part A we show also that w, yˆ, and yd are independent of wealth. Second, in part C we
replace equation (19) by
rse(σ) =
λ
α
∫ yd(σ)
yl
[
U ′(cu(a+ F r(y′, σ)))
U ′(ce(σ, a))
− 1
]
dG. (49)
And third, we show in addition that the job-destruction threshold is given by
yd(σ) = y¯(σ) +
r + λ
r
max{cu(a+ F )− ce(σ, a), 0}. (50)
(This implies that separation is consensual for the marginal job loser—the job destruction
threshold is above the firing threshold—as long as workers strictly prefer being fired to con-
tinuing employment under the existing contract.) Moreover, equation (22) must be replaced
by
p(θ)u = λG(yd(σ∗))[1− u]. (51)
Renegotiation does not affect Lemma 1 or Propositions 2–4, which continue to hold as
stated. In Proposition 5 we can show also that yd(σ∗) > y¯(σ∗), establishing that in the
binding-constraint equilibrium the severance payment is renegotiated with positive proba-
bility. The optimality of separation, together with the functional form for the value function,
also implies that the consumption of the marginal job loser is not higher than it would be
in case of continuation.
As for Proposition 6, when renegotiation is allowed this result is replaced by the following.
Proposition 7. If γ = 0 and F ∗ = Fm > 0, then unemployment u∗ and job destruction
λG(yd(σ∗)) are higher while job creation p(θ∗) and workers’ welfare W e(σ∗, a) = W u(a) are
lower than under laissez-faire.
Figure 4 is the counterpart of Figure 2 above for the case of renegotiation. Note that, in
line with our theoretical result, binding mandates increase rather than decrease unemploy-
ment in the presence of renegotiation.
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Figure 4: Effects of severance-pay mandates for a range of benefit replacement rates, with
optimal, ex-post renegotiation of the severance payment.
A.3 Data and data sources
Table 3 contains the data used to construct the country-specific upper bounds on the excess
of mandated over privately-optimal severance pay used in Sections 5–6. These bounds,
reported in the last column of the table, amount to the maximum (over white and blue
collar workers) difference between the legislated payment fm and the bound on the privately-
optimal payment in equation (25).
The monthly exit rates from unemployment p(θ) are from the OECD unemployment
duration database. The benefit replacement rates ρ come from Nickell (1997), except for the
Italian rate which has been updated using Office of Policy (2002). The interest rate is set at
4 percent annually.
Legislated dismissal costs are constructed as the maximum over blue-collar and white-
collar workers of the sum of notice-period and severance pay. The latter quantities are
obtained by applying the formulas for legislated payments to the average completed job
tenures (ACJT) in the third column of the table (from the data set in Nickell et al. 2002),
averaged over each country’s sample period. The formulas for European countries come
from Grubb and Wells (1993); with the exception of those for Austria, Finland, Norway,
and Sweden, which are derived from IRS (Industrial Relations Service) (1989). The size of
the legislated severance payment for Italy includes damages workers are entitled to if their
dismissal is deemed unfair (5 months) plus the amount they receive if they give up their right
27
blue collar white collar max
Country p(θ) ρ ACJT f n.p. sev. n.p. sev. fm − f
Australia 0.15 36 7.6 4.2 11 2 1 2 8.8
Belgium 0.04 60 24.4 9.2 1.9 — 21a — 11.8
Canada 0.29 59 3.5 1.4 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 −0.4
Denmark 0.12 90 11.9 0.8 3 — 6 1 6.2
Finland 0.15 63 10.4 2.4 4 — 4 — 1.6
France 0.05 57 21.1 8 2 1.7 2 1.7 −4.3
Germany 0.13 63 26.5 4.4 2b — 6b — 1.6
Ireland 0.03 37 11.4 19 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 −16.1
Italy 0.03 40 41.2 18 0.5 20 4 20 6
Netherlands 0.05 70 15.3 5.6 3.3 — 3.3 — −2.3
Norway 0.25 65 11.6 1.4 3 — 3 — −1.6
New Zealand 0.17 30 6.8 4 1 — 1 — −3
Portugal 0.06 65 14.9 5.7 2 15 2 15 11.3
Spain 0.02 70 26.8 12.9 3 12 3 12 2.1
Sweden 0.25 80 10.6 0.8 4b — 4b — 3.2
UK 0.1 38 4.5 6 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 −4.8
USA 0.33 50 3.1 1.5 2c — 2c — 0.5
per month % years months months months months
Notes:
a. ACJT× 0.86; an approximation of the Claeys formula in Grubb and Wells (1993).
b. Dependent on age and length of service; we assume employment started at age 20.
c. Applies only to large-scale layoffs covered by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act.
Table 3: Legislated and privately-optimal dismissal costs for blue-collar and white-
collar workers in various countries, including both notice-period (n.p.) and severance
(sev.) pay.
to reinstatement (15 months). Our value is consistent with the estimates in Ichino (1996).31
The data for Portugal and New Zealand come from European Foundation (2002) and CCH
New Zealand Ltd (2002), respectively. The data for legislation in Australia, Canada, and
the United States are from Bertola et al. (1999).
A.4 Positive utility from leisure
As a further robustness exercise, this section presents an alternative calibration of the model
which allows for a positive utility from leisure and perfect substitutability of consumption
31Note that the formula in Grubb and Wells (1993) wrongly treats as severance pay the “trattamento di
fine rapporto,” a form of forced savings workers are entitled to whatever the reason for termination, including
voluntary quits and summary dismissal. On this point see Brandolini and Torrini (2002).
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(l.-f.) (+11) (+16) (+18) (+23)
Months of wages 1 12 17 19 24
Job finding rate (%) 19.1 18.4 17.9 17.6 16.9
Job destruction (%) 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2
Unemployment rate (%) 6.8 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Gross wage (×100) 98.6 94.1 92.3 91.6 89.9
Tax (×100) 6.3 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.9
Net output 100.0 99.9 99.6 99.5 99.0
Employed welfare 100.0 100.0 99.7 99.6 99.1
Unemployed welfare 100.0 100.0 99.7 99.6 99.2
Table 4: Allocational and welfare effects of severance-pay mandates with ρ = 0.65 and utility
from leisure.
and leisure.32 The felicity function becomes
U(c, l) = −e−α(c−ψl), (52)
where leisure l equals zero for an employed and one for an unemployed worker.
Calibration now requires an additional moment to pin down the extra parameter ψ.
Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), we set the cost of posting a vacancy m so that
the average cost per hired worker m/q(θ) = 0.33. This corresponds to the average cost of
recruiting and hiring a worker in the U.S., according to the survey results in Hamermesh
(1993).33 Matching the Portuguese average unemployment duration and unemployment rate
requires setting ψ = 0.316 and λ = 0.143. All other parameters are the same as in the main
calibration.
Table 4 is the counterpart of Table 2 for the case of positive utility from leisure, and
reports equilibrium quantities for different levels of severance pay in the calibrated economy.
The third column corresponds to the benchmark calibration, and the first column to
its laissez-faire counterpart. Note that the optimal severance payment in the latter equals
one month, rather then six months as in the original calibration. Because of the perfect
substitutability of leisure and consumption and the calibrated value of the rate of substitution
ψ, the utility from leisure compensates job losers for a substantial fraction of their loss of
income.
For comparison, the second and fourth columns of Table 4 report equilibrium quantities
for mandated severance pay that exceeds the laissez-faire quantity by 11 and 18 months,
respectively (the same differences as in columns two and three of Table 2). It is clear that
32From an empirical perspective, the assumption of perfect substitutability between consumption and
leisure, which is also incompatible with balanced growth, is problematic. If anything, applying the calibration
strategy in this section across countries would imply that the utility of leisure is lower in countries with
higher benefit replacement rates. This not only seems counter-intuitive, but would also be contrary to a
well-established tradition (e.g., in the international trade literature) of assuming that tastes are invariant
across countries and policies.
33A comparable estimate for Portugal, our calibrated economy, is not available.
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Figure 5: Effects of severance-pay mandates for a range of benefit replacement rates, with
utility from leisure.
the allocational and welfare implication of these deviations are both small and very similar
under the two calibrations. However, a mandate of 24 months, shown in the fifth column,
generates sizeable efficiency and welfare losses in the new calibration.
Figure 5 is the counterpart of Figure 2 for the case of positive utility from leisure. Here,
for different values of the benefit replacement rate, we plot the optimal severance payment
and the employment, efficiency, and welfare changes associated with a mandate 11 months
higher than the private optimum. In this case an equilibrium with positive employment does
not exist for ρ exceeding 0.65.
A.5 Calibration choices
In this section we discuss choices involved in the calibration of the model’s parameters. The
two moments used in the calibration are the value of the exit rate from unemployment (or
equivalently its inverse, the unemployment duration) and the value of the job destruction
rate (or equivalently the unemployment rate, given the flow equilibrium condition in equation
(22)). Let p∗ and s∗ denote, respectively, the target values for the unemployment exit and
job destruction rates.
Consider first calibration of the parameters that determine the job destruction rate,
assuming that some other parameters can be adjusted to keep the unemployment duration
30
at its target level. That is to say, consider how the targeted job destruction rate identifies
the shock arrival rate and the distribution of shocks via the moment condition
λG(y¯) = s∗. (53)
Given the assumption of a uniform distribution of shocks with upper support normalized
to 1, this condition involves two parameters: the arrival rate λ and the lower support yl
of the distribution. Blanchard and Portugal (2000) choose yl to match the coefficient of
variation for output in Portugal while we set yl = 0. In either case, λ is calibrated to satisfy
the moment condition. Note that, since the uniform distribution has a flat density, the
decomposition of the separation rate λG(y¯) between the arrival rate λ and the conditional
probability of separation G(y¯) is of little relevance provided the lower bound of the support
is not binding (i.e., y¯ > yl) in equilibrium. Mortensen and coauthors normally set λ to some
arbitrary value (typically 0.1 for the US) and then choose yl to satisfy the moment condition
in equation (53). That is to say, in this sort of model λ and yl are not separately identified
without an additional “normalization.” Normalizing yl to zero seems the least objectionable
choice.
We turn now to the calibration of the parameters that affect the job creation margin,
assuming that (for example) λ is adjusted to keep the job destruction rate at its target value
s∗. Note that given the matching function M(u, v) = A(uv)0.5 we have
A(v/u)0.5 = p∗, (54)
which implies that the equilibrium vacancy filling cost equals q∗ = A2/p∗ in the calibrated
economy. Substituting for q∗ in the job creation equation (21) then yields
mp∗
A2
=
1− y¯(σ∗)
r + λ
− F ∗ = Je(1, σ∗). (55)
Given the equilibrium value of Je(1, σ∗) implied by the targeted moments, it follows that
there is an infinite set of 〈m,A〉-pairs consistent with the targeted p∗. In other words, m
and A are also not separately identified without an additional normalization. The main
calibration normalizes A to one and calibrates m to satisfy equation (55).34
The calibration reported in Appendix A.4 introduces an extra parameter, the marginal
utility of leisure ψ, leaving us short one moment condition. In the absence of a comparable
number for Portugal we have again followed Mortensen and set m such that the average
cost of posting a vacancy m/q(θ), on the left hand side of equation (55), equals its estimate
of 0.33 for the US. We then choose ψ so that Je(1, σ∗) satisfies the moment condition in
equation (55).
The effect of mandates is small under all of these parameterizations, which we take as
evidence that this result is driven by the economics of the model and not any particular
parameter choice.
34The calibration is similar to that in Shimer (2005), with the difference that he normalizes A such that
v/u = 1 while we have followed Mortensen and set A = 1.
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